

MEMORANDUM

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SUBJECT: The failure of the Intelligence Staff in respect to the production of CIG Situation Reports together with suggested corrections.

ENCLOSURES: (A) ORE Memorandum No. 11-47, 4 April, Subject: ORE Production Program with attachments:

1. Memorandum for Chief, ICAPS, Assistant Director, ORE signed E. K. Wright, Brigadier General, 25 March 1947.
2. Memorandum Director, CIG, Chief, ICAPS, 2 April 1947, signed J. Klahr Huddle.
3. Memorandum for Assistant Director, R & E, 26 February 1947, ICAPS DRAFT PROPOSAL
4. Memorandum for Assistant Director, R & E, undated, ORE DRAFT PROGRAM.

(B) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Staff, ORE forwarding check list as guide in preparation of Situation Reports dated 14 February 1947.

(C) Intelligence Staff "Critique" on Strategic Survey of Norway.

(D) Memorandum on (C) dated 3 April 1947.

(E) Revision of (B) received in Western European Branch, 23 April 1947.

(F) Comment on (C) dated 18 April 1947

(G) Memorandum for the Assistant Director, R & E from Chief of Intelligence Staff dated 3 April 1947.

SUMMARY

Although the Intelligence Staff was alerted as early as 26 February 1947 (See Enclosure A, 3) to the fact that ORE would be required to produce Situation Reports it has yet not determined, (a) what a Situation Report is for, (b) how it is to be used, (c) what place it is to hold in the intelligence production scheme of ORE, or (d) what form it should

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assume. This statement is made after re-examination of related documents and prolonged conversations with the Chief, Special Projects Division, Intelligence Staff, ORE.

Since it is the primary duty of an executive editor to predetermine the type, and nature of his publications on the basis of a close examination of their prospective readers and the requirements of such readers it is apparent that a basic function of the executive editor is not being performed by the Intelligence Staff. The immediate results of this failure, are (a) to confuse those who are charged with the task of preparing the original manuscripts (b) to waste countless hours of productive time both in the <sup>geographic</sup> ~~producing~~ branches and in the Intelligence Staff (c) to further injure the morale of the geographic branches (d) to further block production in ORE.

#### NARRATIVE

The Intelligence Staff was alerted, at least as early as February 1947, to the fact that it would be required to produce Situation Reports covering the nations of the world. This fact is contained in Enclosure (A), item 1. In early March, the Northern Branch, which was at that time a component of the Western Europe Branch, was assigned its first Situation Report; the

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25X1 This country had been selected by agreement between the Chief, Western Europe and the Chief, Special Projects Division, I.S. because of the apparent simplicity of the task [ ] being a small country which exerts little effect on US security. No indication was received by the WE Branch from the I.S. either through conversation or in writing as to the form, style, content, or purpose of a Situation Report. Questions about these matters elicited the reply: "We don't know. We'll have to work it out as we go along."

Enclosure (B), dated 14 February was the only indication of overall thinking on the part of the IS that was available at the beginning of the work on this manuscript. It is a check list suggesting a range of subjects which might be dealt with in a Situation Report. The covering memorandum states that items on this list which are not applicable to a given country should be disregarded.

Before the work on the [ ] Survey was begun, 25X1 consideration was given by the WE Branch to this check list and to the conversations that had been had with the IS. It was decided in WE that the check list might be regarded as suggesting the form in which the manuscript could be prepared, that this form might become standard for all such surveys, that presumably, such a form would make possible the use of loose leaf folders or file cards. It was also assumed that the SUMMARY section, which is the first item on the check list, would contain a brief narrative account of a foreign nation as it might affect, alone or in com-

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mination, the security of the US. The fact that the check list began with a SUMMARY or precis for which no specifications were offered save that it would be on "(2 single-spaced 8 x 10 pages)" confirmed the WE Branch in the opinion that the balance of the list must be considered, as stated above, as indicating the form in which the evidence supporting the Summary should be cast.

25X1 Although the [ ] Desk had not been activated in February 1947 the writing was begun immediately by the only person available: a young woman who had never been to [ ] and who had no special qualifications for the task. She was later reinforced by another young woman of equal [ ] knowledge. When the manuscript was somewhat more than half completed, one of these young women was reassigned owing to the arrival of the present head of the [ ] Desk. 25X1 He was able to work for about two weeks on the Survey before it was submitted on the predetermined deadline. 25X1 Before leaving the WE Branch the manuscript was extensively edited for meaning and construction by the Chief and an editor who regarded the work as necessarily incomplete, but the best that could be expected in view of (a) lack of experienced personnel (b) lack of a sufficient staff (c) total failure of the IS to indicate its desires.

25X1 Enclosure (C) is a written "critique" prepared in the Special Projects Division, IS on the first draft of the [ ] Survey. Enclosure (D) is a memorandum written in response in WE immediately after the receipt

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of Enclosure (C).

In the early part of April, which is to say after Enclosure (C) had been considered by responsible personnel in WE, the Chief, Special Projects Division, called on the Branch to discuss the [ ] Survey. 25X1

During the course of this conversation, it was pointed out to him that changes proposed in the "critique" revealed even less knowledge [ ] than was evident 25X1

in the draft of the Survey; that the "critique" was so loosely thought out as to furnish no guidance of value in effecting a final revision of the manuscript, and that the "critique" was so poorly expressed as to leave doubt of the professional editorial capacities of its author. It was also pointed out to the Chief that even with the best will in the world an effort to respond constructively to such a "critique" could not be productive because of its vagueness, and slipshod character. In order to avoid the very considerable wastage of manpower that would follow if the manuscript were to be revised, and probably revised again, on so shadowy a basis, the Chief was asked to submit a criticism such as might be published in a technical journal on a scientific book. It was suggested that ORE must regard itself as a professional organization, that the editors must rise to professional standards and that if they did, the production of intelligence would be inestimably expedited and the general gloom and uncertainty felt in the Geographic Branches would be dissipated. The Chief replied that he would rather negotiate editorial changes in conferences. This was objected to on the ground that

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such a procedure has always lead in ORE to misunderstandings, that it relieves the editors of the Special Project Division of the necessity of applying professional standards to their own work, and that unless the criticisms were written, and a general policy established through them, the present unsatisfactory working conditions would continue.

During this conference, the Chief made it clear that the check list of 14 February must be regarded only in respect to background material and that it had no necessary relationship to the finished report as to form or content. Situation Reports, it appeared from this conversation, were to be compact essays on the various countries, summaries, so to speak, of the relevant facts indicated in the check list, where these applied. The check list it was said was not to be regarded as establishing the form of the reports.

Some surprise was felt therefore when Enclosure (E) was received in WE. The new check list was nearly three times as long as the original and, as pointed out in Enclosure (F) it was for the most part irrelevant to the production of Situation Reports if these were, theoretically at least, to be distinguished from the Basic Intelligence Studies. It is also indicative of the reigning confusion that the current draft of the [ ] Study is not in essay form but follows, in general structure, the earlier check list.

In closing this memorandum, it should be noted that the [ ] study is still unpublished, despite constant rewriting and re-editing. This is notable

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